Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms

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National Bureau of Economic Research , Cambridge, MA
StatementJonathan Vogel.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 14978, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 14978.
ContributionsNational Bureau of Economic Research.
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LC ClassificationsHB1
The Physical Object
FormatElectronic resource
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Open LibraryOL23683751M
LC Control Number2009656037

SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS* JONATHAN VOGEL† In this paper we aim to explain intuitively heterogeneous firms’ optimal location decisions in a simple spatial market.

To do so, we present and solve a four-stage game of entry, location, pricing and consumption in a spatial price discrimination framework with. Spatial Price Discrimination with Heterogeneous Firms Article in Journal of Industrial Economics 59(4) May with 14 Reads How we measure 'reads'Author: Jonathan Vogel.

Spatial Price Discrimination with Heterogeneous Firms Jonathan Vogel. NBER Working Paper No.

Details Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms EPUB

Issued in May NBER Program(s):International Trade and Investment, Industrial Organization In this paper we present and solve a three-stage game of entry, location, and pricing in a spatial price discrimination framework with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms.

Get this from a library. Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms. [Jonathan Vogel; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- In this paper we present and solve a three-stage game of entry, location, and pricing in a spatial price discrimination framework with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms.

We provide a unique. Downloadable (with restrictions). In this paper we present and solve a three-stage game of entry, location, and pricing in a spatial price discrimination framework with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms.

We provide a unique characterization of all equilibria without imposing restrictions on the distribution of marginal costs. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item. Spatial Price Discrimination with Heterogeneous Firms Jonathan Vogel Columbia and NBER August Jonathan Vogel (Columbia and NBER) SPD w/ Heterogeneous Firms August 1 / ANDERSON & DE PALMA SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION book, Cha and Greenhut and Ohta (), Chapter 8, Appendix II for the application to spatial price discrimination).

However, no explicit framework of analysis for dealing with the problem of product heterogeneity in. To do so, we present and solve a four-stage game of entry, location, pricing and consumption in a spatial price discrimination framework with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms.

The equilibrium locations of two firms are partially centralized to the socially optimal extent if there is spatial price discrimination, and if each firm has two out of three products, or else one variety of a differentiated product with some consumers indifferent between by: We consider a vertically structured market with two retail firms of mixed ownership competing against each other exercising spatial price discrimination.

We examine the strategic behavior of downstream rivals as well as the effect of privatization on the intensity of competition and welfare in two cases; when location decisions are taken sequentially and when location decisions are taken Author: Konstantinos Eleftheriou, Nickolas Michelacakis.

Firms are heterogeneous in that they differ in their constant marginal costs of production. In the first stage, each of a set of heterogeneous firms simultaneously locates in space.1 In the second stage, firms si-multaneously set their prices.

The model is related to a theoretical spatial competition literature2. (iv) The price charged by the domestic low-cost firms (p 11 ℓ) is the lowest price prevailing in country 1, whereas the highest one is the price set by the foreign high-cost firms (p 21 h).

(v) Any firm having to pay a higher cost to supply a market absorbs half of the corresponding cost wedge (m or t).Cited by: Spatial price discrimination Intertemporal Stigler uses the example of a book that sells in hard cover for $15 and in paperback for $5.

Hefe, he argues, there is a presumption of there is an incentive to engage in price discrimination. For to say that price is. Heterogeneous Firms and Trade Marc J. Melitz and Stephen J. Redding NBER Working Paper No. December JEL No. F10,F12,F14 ABSTRACT This paper reviews the new approach to international trade based on firm heterogeneity in differentiatedFile Size: KB.

various products.

Description Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms EPUB

Some of this literature focuses on price dispersion within a single firm (i.e., price discrimination), some on dispersion across firms. This paper concentrates on the latter, though the possibility of within-firm price variation existing in the data will be discussed further below.

Downloadable. This paper presents a theoretical discussion and an empirical investigation of the impact of distance on the spatial pricing policy of exporting firms. The theoretical part points out the importance of transport costs formulation to determine how distance impacts fob prices.

Assuming additive or iceberg transport costs might imply opposite predictions concerning this relationship. Spatial Competition with Heterogeneous Firms Jonathan Vogel November Jonathan Vogel Spatial Competition 11/14 1 / Introduction 2 Price stage Jonathan Vogel Spatial Competition 11/14 12 / The game Firms play a two-stage game of complete information 1 Location stage.

Published: Richard E. Baldwin & Toshihiro Okubo, "Heterogeneous firms, agglomeration and economic geography: spatial selection and sorting," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol.

6(3), pagesJune.

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citation courtesy of. Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these. The spatial selection of heterogeneous firms. Toshihiro Okubo (), Pierre Picard and Jacques Thisse (). Journal of International Economics,vol. 82, issue 2, Abstract: We show that heterogeneous firms choose different locations in response to market integration.

Specifically, decreasing trade costs lead to the gradual agglomeration of efficient firms in the larger country where Cited by:   The unidirectional Hotelling model is extended to allow for elastic demand functions. A two-stage Bertrand-type model and a two-stage Cournot-type model are considered.

If firms choose location and then set prices, agglomeration never arises; instead, if firms choose location and then set quantities, agglomeration arises at one endpoint of the segment when the transportation costs are low Cited by: You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please lo. I model endogenous horizontal and vertical product differentiation with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms.

Firms are asymmetric in that they differ in their marginal costs. I prove that under an equilibrium refinement, all economically relevant firm outcomes are uniquely determined across all strict subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

There are two central by: Psychology Definition of SPATIAL DISCRIMINATION: Being able to detect differences in spatial location.

The unidirectional Hotelling model with spatial price discrimination Stefano Colombo Catholic University of Milan Abstract The unidirectional Hotelling model where consumers can buy only from firms located on their right (left) is extended to allow for price discriminating firms and a.

Price discrimination can be divided into three different types or “degrees”: 1. Perfect Price Discrimination. In the case of first-degree price discrimination, otherwise known as “perfect” price discrimination or personalized pricing, the seller knows and charges the maximum possible price every buyer is willing to pay.

We examine duopolists that have convex production costs and locate under spatial price discrimination in anticipation of a merger. We show that the merger frequently results in locations that reduce social cost.

This contrasts with the well-known result that with linear production costs the merger distorts locations to increase social by: 3. T1 - The spatial selection of heterogeneous firms. AU - Okubo, Toshihiro. AU - Picard, Pierre M. AU - Thisse, Jacques François.

PY - /11/1. Y1 - /11/1. N2 - We show that heterogeneous firms choose different locations in response to market by: Heterogeneous Firms Notes for Graduate International Trade Lectures J. Peter Neary University of Oxford February 3, J.P. Neary (University of Oxford) Heterogeneous Firms February 3, 1 / 65File Size: KB.

We develop a spatial linear model of heterogeneous switching costs that allows for asymmetric distributions of heterogeneous switching costs.

We not only model uniform pricing and history-based price discrimination, but also the impact of regulatory intervention aimed at making it easier for customers to be upgraded to a better tariff from.

large central region, when heterogeneous –rms are added to a trade and geography framework.1 Thus, their model produces a spatial sorting pattern with the most productive –rms in the centre and the least productive –rms in the periphery.

The sorting pattern is ampli–ed by trade by: 9. Norman (), indicate that the spatial monopolist should adopt a discriminatory spatial pricing policy (where spatial price discrimination is taken, conventionally, to mean that delivered prices do not follow an f.o.b.

scheme, but that all concumers equidistant from a particular supplier pay the same price).Empirical Background Plan of Lectures 1 Empirical Background 2 Overview of the Melitz Model 3 Equilibrium in Autarky 4 E ects of Trade 5 Extensions J.P.

Neary (University of Oxford) Heterogeneous Firms Janu 3 / 29File Size: KB.Another complication: spatial price discrimination Some firms employ spatial price discrimination E.g., charge higher prices to nearby “captive” consumers Must account for geographic distributions of shares and prices Exacerbates data availability problem Some structural work .